Sticky: No Racism Please. Aristocracy, Liberty, Prosperity are Universals

Please don’t bring that stuff here. I work against fraud and deception in all matters political. And yes, truths are truths, but criticisms are not solutions, they’re excuses for not looking in the mirror at the person responsible for the current state of things. Act. Solve Problems. Don’t complain.


Wisdom of Crowds: Stereotypes Are The Most Accurate Measure in Social Science

(apologies to the author but I must keep these ‘finds’ in my database. The internet is not dependable enough.)
By Lee Jussim
Psychological perspectives once defined stereotypes as inaccurate, casting them as rigid (Lippmann, 1922/1991), rationalizations of prejudice (Jost & Banaji, 1994; La Piere, 1936), out of touch with reality (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999), and exaggerations based on small “kernels of truth” (Allport, 1954/1979; Table 1). These common definitions are untenable. Almost any belief about almost any group has been considered a “stereotype” in empirical studies. It is, however, logically impossible for all group beliefs to be inaccurate. This would make it “inaccurate” to believe that two groups differ or that they do not differ.
Alternatively, perhaps stereotypes are only inaccurate group beliefs, and so therefore accurate beliefs are not stereotypes. If this were true, one would first have to empirically establish that the belief is inaccurate—otherwise, it would not be a stereotype. The rarity of such demonstrations would mean that there are few known stereotypes. Increasing recognition of these logical problems has led many modern reviews to abandon “inaccuracy” as a core definitional component of stereotypes (see Jussim et al, 2016 for a review).
Nonetheless, an emphasis on inaccuracy remains, which is broadly inconsistent with empirical research. My book, Social Perception and Social Reality: Why Accuracy Dominates Bias and Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, (hence SPSR) reviewed 80 years of social psychological scholarship and showed that there was widespread emphasis on inaccuracy. Some social psychologists have argued that the “kernel of truth” notion means social psychology has long recognized stereotype accuracy, but I do not buy it. It creates the impression that, among an almost entirely rotten cob, there is a single decent kernel, the “kernel of truth.” And if you doubt that is what this means, consider a turnabout test (Duarte et al, 2015): How would you feel if someone described social psychology has having a “kernel of truth?” Would that be high praise?

This blog is not the place to review the overwhelming evidence of stereotype accuracy, though interested readers are directed to SPSR and our updated reviews that have appeared in Current Directions in Psychological Science (Jussim et al, 2015) and Todd Nelson’s Handbook of Stereotypes, Prejudice and Discrimination (Jussim et al, 2016). Summarizing those reviews:
Over 50 studies have now been performed assessing the accuracy of demographic, national, political, and other stereotypes.
Stereotype accuracy is one of the largest and most replicable effects in all of social psychology. Richard et al (2003) found that fewer than 5% of all effects in social psychology exceeded r’s of .50. In contrast, nearly all consensual stereotype accuracy correlations and about half of all personal stereotype accuracy correlations exceed .50.[1]
The evidence from both experimental and naturalistic studies indicates that people apply their stereotypes when judging others approximately rationally. When individuating information is absent or ambiguous, stereotypes often influence person perception. When individuating information is clear and relevant, its effects are “massive” (Kunda & Thagard, 1996, yes, that is a direct quote, p. 292), and stereotype effects tend to be weak or nonexistent. This puts the lie to longstanding claims that “stereotypes lead people to ignore individual differences.”
There are only a handful of studies that have examined whether the situations in which people rely on stereotypes when judging individuals increases or reduces person perception accuracy. Although those studies typically show that doing so increases person perception accuracy, there are too few to reach any general conclusion. Nonetheless, that body of research provides no support whatsoever for the common presumption that the ways and conditions under which people rely on stereotypes routinely reduces person perception accuracy.

Bian and Cimpian step into this now large literature and simply declare it to be wrong. They do not review the evidence. They do not suggest the evidence is flawed or misinterpreted. Bian & Cimpian simple ignore the data. That sounds like a strong charge, but, if you think it is too strong, I request that you re-read their critique. The easiest way to maintain any cherished belief is to just ignore contrary data – something that is distressingly common, not only in social psychology (Jussim et al, in press), but in medicine (Ioannidis, 2005), astronomy (Loeb, 2014), environmental engineering (Kolowich, 2016), and across the social sciences (Pinker, 2002).
How, then, do Bian and Cimpian aspire to reach any conclusion about stereotype accuracy without grappling with the data? Their critique rests primarily on declaring (without empirical evidence) that most stereotypes are “generic” beliefs, which renders them inherently inaccurate, so no empirical evidence of stereotype inaccuracy is even necessary. This is the first failure of this critique. They report no data assessing the prevalence of stereotypes as generic beliefs. An empirical question (“what proportion of people’s stereotypes are generic beliefs?”) can never be resolved by declaration.
That failing is sufficient to render their analysis irrelevant to understanding the state of the evidence regarding stereotype accuracy.. However, it also fails on other grounds, which are instructive to consider because they are symptomatic of a common error made by social psychologists. They fall victim to the processistic fallacy, which was addressed in SPSR. Thus, my response to these critiques begins by quoting that text (p. 394):
To address accuracy, research must somehow assess how well people’s stereotypes (or the perceptions of individuals) correspond with reality. The evidence that social psychologists typically review when emphasizing stereotype inaccuracy does not do this. Instead, that evidence typically demonstrates some sort of cognitive process, which is then presumed – without testing for accuracy – to lead to inaccuracy…
Social psychologists have many “basic phenomena” that are presumed (without evidence) to cause inaccuracy: categorization supposedly exaggerates real differences between groups, ingroup biases, illusory correlations, automatic activation of stereotypes, the ultimate attribution error, and many more. None, however, have ever been linked to the actual (in)accuracy of lay people’s stereotypes. Mistaking processes speculatively claimed to cause stereotype inaccuracy, for evidence of actual stereotype inaccuracy, is the prototypical example of the processistic fallacy.
Their prototypical cases of supposedly inherently erroneous generic beliefs are those such as “mosquitos carry the West Nile virus” and “ducks lay eggs” (Leslie, Khemlani, & Glucksberg, 2011). They cite evidence that people judge such statements to be true. They argue that this renders people inaccurate because few mosquitos carry West Nile virus and not all ducks lay eggs. Ipso facto, according to their argument, stereotypes that are generic beliefs also cannot be accurate.
Even if people’s beliefs about ducks’ egg laying were generic and wrong, we would still have no direct information about the accuracy of their beliefs about other people. So, how does this translate to stereotypes? Bian and Cimpian cite another paper by Leslie (in press) in support of the claim that “”more people hold the generic belief that Muslims are terrorists than hold the generic belief that Muslims are female.” What was Leslie’s (in press) “evidence”? Quotes from headline-seeking politicians and a rise in hate crimes post-9/11. In short, this is no evidence whatsoever that bears on the claim that “more people believe Muslims are terrorists than Muslims are female.” Of course, even if this were valid, how it would bear on stereotype accuracy is entirely unclear, because that would depend, not on researcher assumptions about what people mean when they agree with statements like, “Muslims are terrorists” but on evidence assessing what people actually mean. The stereotyping literature is so strongly riddled with invalid researcher presumptions about lay people’s beliefs, that, absent hard empirical evidence about what people actually believe, researcher assumptions that are not backed up by evidence do not warrant credibility.
If, as seems to be widely assumed in discussions such as Bian and Cimpian’s, agreeing that “Muslims are terrorists” means “all Muslims are terrorists” then such stereotypes are clearly inaccurate (indeed, SPSR specifically points out that all or nearly all absolute stereotypes of the form ALL of THEM are X are inherently inaccurate, because human variability is typically sufficient to invalidate almost any such absolutist claim). However, the problem here is the presumption that agreeing that “Muslims are terrorists” is equivalent to the belief that “all Muslims are terrorists.” Maybe it is, but if so, that cannot be empirically supported just because researchers say so. I suspect many would agree that “Alaska is cold” (indeed, I would myself) – but doing so does not necessarily also entail the assumption that every day in every location in Alaska is always frigidly cold. Juneau routinely hits the 70 degree mark, which I do not consider particularly cold. Yet, I would still agree that “Alaska is cold.” Whether any particular generic beliefs is, in fact, absolutist requires evidence. In the absence of such evidence, researchers are welcome to present their predictions as speculations about stereotypes’ supposed absolute or inaccurate content, but they should not be presenting their own presumptions as facts.
Bian and Cimpian acknowledge that statistical beliefs are far more capable of being accurate, but then go on to claim that most stereotypes are not statistical beliefs, or, at least, generically based stereotypes are more potent influences on social perceptions. They present no assessment, however, of the relative frequencies with which people’s beliefs about groups are generic versus statistical. Again, there is an assumption without evidence.
But let’s consider the implications of their claim that most people’s stereotypes include little or no statistical understanding of the distributions of characteristics among groups. According to this view, laypeople would have little idea about racial/ethnic differences in high school or college graduate rates, or about the nonverbal skill differences between men and women, and are clueless about differences in the policy positions held by Democrats and Republicans. That leads to a very simple prediction – that people’s judgments of these distributions would be almost entirely unrelated to the actual distributions; correlations of stereotypes with criteria would be near zero and discrepancy scores would be high. One cannot have it both ways. If people are statistically clueless, then their beliefs should be unrelated to statistical distributions of characteristics among groups. If people’s beliefs do show strong relations to statistical realities, then they are not statistically clueless.
We already know that the predictions generated from the “most stereotypes are generic and are therefore statistically clueless” are disconfirmed by the data summarized in SPSR, and in Jussim et al (2015, 2016). Bian and Cimpian have developed compelling descriptions of the processes that they believe should lead people to be inaccurate. In point of empirical fact, however, people have mostly been found to be fairly accurate. Disconfirmation of such predictions can occur for any of several reasons:
The processes identified as “causing” inaccuracy do not occur with the frequency that those offering them assume (maybe most stereotypes are not generic).
The processes are quite common and do cause inaccuracy, but are mitigated by other countervailing processes that increase accuracy (e.g., perhaps people often adjust their beliefs in response to corrective information).
The processes are common, but, in real life, lead to much higher levels of accuracy than those emphasizing inaccuracy presume (see SPSR for more details). Regardless, making declarations about levels of stereotype inaccuracy on the basis of a speculative prediction that some process causes stereotype inaccuracy, rather than on the basis of evidence that directly bears on accuracy, is a classic demonstration of the processistic fallacy.

In science, the convention is to support empirical claims with evidence, typically via a citation. This should be an obvious point, but far too often, scientific articles have declared stereotypes to be inaccurate either without a single citation, or by citing an article that itself provides no empirical evidence of stereotype inaccuracy. My collaborators and I (e.g., Jussim et al, 2016) have taken to referring to this as “the black hole at the bottom of declarations of stereotype inaccuracy.” For example:
“… stereotypes are maladaptive forms of categories because their content does not correspond to what is going on in the environment” (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999, p. 467).
There is no citation here. It is a declaration without any provided empirical support.
Or consider this:
“The term stereotype refers to those interpersonal beliefs and expectancies that are both widely shared and generally invalid (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981).” (Miller & Turnbull, 1986, p. 233).
There is a citation here – to Ashmore and Del Boca (1981). Although Ashmore and Del Boca (1981) did review how prior researchers defined stereotypes, they did not review or provide empirical evidence that addressed the accuracy of stereotypes. Thus, the Miller and Turnbull (1986) quote also ends in an empirical black hole. Bian and Cimpian’s argument that “stereotypes are inaccurate” based on studies that did not assess stereotype accuracy is a modern and sophisticated version of this argument from a black hole.

That question is directed to all readers of this blog entry who still maintain the claim that “stereotypes are inaccurate.” Scientific beliefs should at least be capable of falsification and correction; otherwise, they are more like religion.
Bian and Cimpian follow a long and venerable social psychological tradition of declaring stereotypes inaccurate without: 1. Grappling with the overwhelming evidence of stereotype accuracy; and 2. Without providing new evidence that directly assesses accuracy. This raises the question, if 50 high quality studies demonstrating stereotype accuracy across many groups, many beliefs, many labs, and many decades is not enough to get you to change your mind, what could?
I can tell you what could change my belief that the evidence shows most stereotypes are usually at least fairly accurate. If most of the next 50 studies on the topic provide little or no evidence of inaccuracy, I would change my view. Indeed, in our most recent reviews (Jussim et al, 2015, 2016) we pointed out two areas in which the weight of the evidence shows inaccuracy. National character stereotypes are often inaccurate when compared against Big Five Personality measures (interestingly, however, they are often more accurate when other criterion measures are used); and political stereotypes (e.g., people’s beliefs about Democrats versus Republicans, or liberals versus conservatives) generally exaggerate real differences. Show me the data, and I will change my view.
If no data could lead you to change your position, then your position is not scientific. It is completely appropriate for people’s morals to inform or even determine their political attitudes and policy positions. What is not appropriate, however, is for that to be the case, and then to pretend that one’s position is based on science.

Stereotype accuracy is one of the largest effects in all of social psychology. Given social psychology’s current crisis of replicability, and widespread concerns about questionable research practices (e.g., Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Simmons et al, 2011), one might expect that social psychologists would be shouting to the world that we have actually found a valid, independently replicable, powerful phenomena.
But if one did think that, one could not possibly be more wrong. Testaments to the inaccuracy of stereotypes still dominate textbooks and broad reviews of the stereotyping literature that appear in scholarly books. The new generation of scholars is still being brought up to believe that “stereotypes are inaccurate,” a claim many will undoubtedly take for granted as true, and then promote in their own scholarship. Sometimes, these manifest as definitions of stereotypes as inaccurate; and even when stereotypes are not defined as inaccurate, they manifest as declarations that stereotypes are inaccurate, exaggerated, or overgeneralized. Social psychologists are unbelievably terrific at coming up with reasons why stereotypes “should” be inaccurate, typically presented as statements that they “are” inaccurate. Social psychologists are, however, often less good at correcting their cherished beliefs in the face of contrary data than many of us would have hoped (Jussim et al, in press).
Self-correction is, supposedly, one of the hallmarks of true sciences. Failure to self-correct in the face of overwhelming data is, to me, a threat to the scientific integrity of our field. Perhaps, therefore, most of us can agree that, with respect to the longstanding claim that “stereotypes are inaccurate,” a little scientific self-correction is long overdue.
Allport, G. W. (1954/1979). The nature of prejudice (2nd edition). Cambridge, MA : Perseus Books.
Ashmore, R. D., & Del Boca, F. K. (1981). Conceptual approaches to stereotypes and stereotyping. In D. L. Hamilton (Ed.), Cognitive processes in stereotyping and intergroup behavior (pp.1-35). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999). The unbearable automaticity of being. American Psychologist, 54, 462-479.
Duarte, J. L., Crawford, J. T., Stern, C., Haidt, J., Jussim, L., & Tetlock, P. E. (2015). Political diversity will improve social psychological science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 38, 1-54.
Ioannidis, J. P. (2012). Why science is not necessarily self-correcting. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 645-654.
Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M. R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system‑justification and the production of false consciousness. British Journal of Social Psychology, 33, 1‑27.
Jussim, L. (2012). Social perception and social reality: Why accuracy dominates bias and self-fulfilling prophecy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Jussim, L., Cain, T., Crawford, J., Harber, K., & Cohen, F. (2009). The unbearable accuracy of stereotypes. In T. Nelson (Ed.), Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (pp.199-227). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Jussim, L., Crawford, J.T., Anglin, S. M., Chambers, J. R., Stevens, S. T., & Cohen, F. (2016). Stereotype accuracy: One of the largest and most replicable effects in all of social psychology. Pp. 31-63, in T. Nelson (ed.), Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (second edition). New York: Psychology Press.
Jussim, L., Crawford, J. T., Anglin, S. M., Stevens, S. M., & Duarte, J. L. (In press). Interpretations and methods: Towards a more effectively self-correcting social psychology. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology.
Jussim, L., Crawford, J. T., & Rubinstein, R. S. (2015). Stereotype (In)accuracy in perceptions of groups and individuals. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 24, 490-497.
Kolowich. S. (February 2, 2016). The water next time: Professor who helped expose crisis in Flynt says public science is broken. Chronicle of Higher Education. Retrieved on 2/3/16 from:
Kunda, Z., & Thagard, P. (1996). Forming impressions from stereotypes, traits, and behaviors: A parallel-constraint-satisfaction theory. Psychological Review, 103, 284-308.
LaPiere, R. T. (1936). Type-rationalizations of group antipathy. Social Forces, 15, 232-237.
Leslie, S.J. (in press). The Original Sin of Cognition: Fear, Prejudice and Generalization. The Journal of Philosophy.
Leslie, S., Khemlani, S., & Glucksberg, S. (2011). Do all ducks lay eggs? The generic overgeneralization effect. Journal of Memory and Language, 65, 15–31.
Loeb, A. (2014). Benefits of diversity. Nature: Physics, 10, 616-617.
Lippmann, W. (1922/1991). Public opinion. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Miller, D.T., & Turnbull, W. (1986). Expectancies and interpersonal processes. Annual Review of Psychology, 37, 233-256.
Open Science Collaboration. (2015). Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science. Science, 349, aac4716. doi: 10.1126/science.aac4716
Pinker, S. (2002). The blank slate. New York City: Penguin Books.
Richard, F. D., Bond, C. F. Jr., & Stokes-Zoota, J. J. (2003). One hundred years of social psychology quantitatively described. Review of General Psychology, 7, 331-363.
Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. (2011). False-positive psychology undisclosed flexibility in data collection and analysis allows presenting anything as significant. Psychological Science, 22, 1359-1366.
[1] Consensual stereotypes refer to beliefs shared by a group and are usually assessed by means. For example, you might be teaching a psychology of 30 students, and ask them to estimate the college graduation rates for five demographic groups. Consensual stereotype accuracy can be assessed by correlating the class mean on these estimates with, e.g., Census data on graduate rates for the different groups. Personal stereotype accuracy is assessed identically, but for each person, separately. So, one would assess Fred’s personal stereotype accuracy by correlating Fred’s estimates for each group with the Census data. See SPSR, Chapter 16, for a much more detailed description of different aspects of stereotype accuracy and how they can be assessed.


On Stereotypes - They're True.

By Eli Harman

The following is my condensed restatement of Jason Cogwell’s theory of confirmation bias as a collective cognition strategy.
There are a great many instances where making a generalization could be useful, helpful, or necessary. But most people aren’t in posession of enough information to make rigorous and defensible generalizations very often. what people are doing is constantly forming or hearing hypotheses. If a thought occurs to me, or if I hear an observation or speculation from someone else, and then soon after see some fact or situation that appears to correspond to that hypothesis, then that hypothesis will be “confirmed” (in my mind.) And each subsequent “confirmation” will tend to make it seem more compelling, to me. Epistemically, this one off correspondence (or even a pattern of correspondence) means nothing. It could be coincidence. It could be random chance. There could be something going on, but something *other* than I speculated, etc… But what it causes me to do is adopt the hypothesis as a predictive model for myself and restate it to others (until it is disconfirmed to my satisfaction.) If their experience does not confirm (disconfirms) my hypothesis then they will quickly forget about it. They’re hearing random hypotheses all the time and many of them don’t hold, and are therefore discarded. But, if THEIR experience “confirms” the hypothesis, in their own mind, then they will adopt it and restate it to still others.

The implication should be obvious. Confirmation bias will cause all people, some of the time, to adopt false hypotheses and act as if they were true, just by random chance. Thinking those hypotheses true, they will then restate them to others. But false hypotheses will tend to fizzle out and die, as others will not adopt them consistently if they are not subsequently “confirmed” in their own experience. True hypotheses, on the other hand, those which correspond to reality, those with consistent predictive power, will tend to spread further and faster, until they attain the status of common knowledge, or widely known stereotype. What tends to produce accurate hypotheses and stereotypes is not the cognitive processes and strategies of any given individual (for these are indeed biased and flawed) but the iterated spread of ideas through a population over time. And research show that this is indeed effective. Commonly held stereotypes correspond to reality with a correlation of between .4 and .9, with an average correlation of about .8.…/rebellious-scientist-surprising-tru…/

In other words, stereotypes are an extremely accurate description of reality. And that description, of sometimes very subtle phenomena, is accurate not because anyone has the means to probe them adequately themselves, but because their inadequate means, taken together, amount to an extremely powerful engine of empirical research, of conjecture and refutation.

Every individual is a laboratory for testing hypotheses. Confirmation bias causes individuals, taken in isolation, to believe wrong ideas are true. But it is tremendously valuable in sorting hypotheses, which to kill, and which to submit to others for further testing (for that’s really what people are doing when they “adopt a hypothesis as true.”) With time and repetition, the consensus tends to converge on the truth.

Jason gave us a hypothetical example. Suppose there are two kinds of people, green people and blue people. Green people are 95% of the population and tell the truth 99% of the time. Blue people are 5% of the population and lie 5% of the time. How are people to discover that blue people are less trustworthy (five times less trustworthy?) Well, start out, at random, with the hypotheses “green people lie” and “blue people lie” by coin flip if necessary. The “green people lie” hypothesis will be confirmed very rarely and spread very slowly. The “blue people lie” hypothesis will be confirmed more often and spread more rapidly, and moreover, this effect will snowball and compound, despite the fact that blue people still tell the truth most of the time, and most green people interact with blue people very rarely (they’re only 5% of the population.)

But there is a catch. What if they blue people lie much more than 5% of the time? It could be that almost all of them lie almost all of the time, but they tell very subtle lies like “there is no difference in the rate at which blue people and green people lie.” How would you catch them in such a lie? Who’s keeping statistics on such things? That’s a lie, incidentally, that would be “confirmed” the vast majority of the time, since the vast majority of the time, it is impossible to catch either the blue people or the green people in a lie. And if they repeat that lie enough, they can get it accepted as a consensus, and then proceed to invoke altrusitic punishment and social sanction against anyone who questions it… (“That’s preposterous! You should be ashamed to say such a thing! You’re a bad person for even thinking such a thing!”)

Extra credit. Model this scenario and determine what kind of gap or delta can be created between the consensus “there is no difference in the rate of lying” and the reality of measurable differences in verifiable and actionable fraud and deception, and what it costs to maintain, in terms of repetition.


Privilege as a Commons

Critics of privilege allege that it is unearned, and therefore unfair. Well, part of that’s true, so far as it goes. I didn’t earn my privilege. I inherited most of it. But I do pay to maintain it. And I must pay to add to it, so that I may pass on more to my children.Every time I’m extended privilege, I’m necessarily given the opportunity to abuse it.

When I go into a store, say, and am not followed around by security, I’m given the opportunity to steal. By foregoing that opportunity, I’m bearing an opportunity cost, and in so doing, paying for my privilege, and at the same time, maintaining it as a commons for others like me to enjoy.

When I am pulled over by a cop, and am polite and cooperative rather than belligerent and reactive, not only do I purchase a better outcome for myself, but for everyone who resembles me (in whatever way.)

Every time I seek to do my share, rather than to shirk; to pay my way, rather than to free ride; to give, rather than take; I pay into the privilege bank. I can only ever cash in a fraction of that. But if I can count on others like me to do likewise, we all come out ahead.

Now, if someone would be willing to bear those costs, but their coethnics are not, or are less willing than others, that’s unfortunate for them.

But if they demand the same privilege, it is they who are demanding something unearned, and that their coethnics have not demonstrated a willingness to pay for, or at least an equal willingness to pay for. They are demanding that others take a risk for their benefit in extending them privilege; one that has not been shown to be a good risk but rather, a bad one, one not worth the cost of taking.

If you want privilege, pay for its construction as a commons. But do not attack those who do and demand that they share their privilege with you, and offer nothing in return.

Now some might object that this is “collectivism” or “collective responsibility” and we should instead only judge anyone as individuals.

But that is not a reasonable objection nor a reasonable suggestion.

I don’t hold anyone accountable for the misdeeds of people who resemble them. But I can’t necessarily tell them apart. There is a cost involved in telling them apart. It takes time, effort, energy, resources, etc… And even then, there is risk, because it’s not foolproof.

Now, if someone doesn’t want to be profiled, or discriminated against, there are three ways they can realistically attack this issue.

They can help make it easier (and therefore less costly) for me to distinguish them from less reputable elements by using signals (dress, mannerisms, speech etc…) which demonstrate that they are not a threat, that they are successful, reliable, etc…

They can increase the value of what they can OFFER me so that I have more incentive to invest in telling them apart.

Or they can suppress the misbehavior of the disreputable element within their community themselves to reduce the NEED for me to tell them apart; to reduce the risk for me of failing to tell them apart.

But to simply demand that I presume they are not part of that element, when I have no way of knowing whether they are part of that element or not, is to demand that I take a risk. And even if that risk is a good risk, and worth my while in their case, that demand includes the demand I extend the same benefit of the doubt to all others. And that is not worth my while.

This is, so far as I can tell, an accurate and truthful (though not necessarily full) account of what social justice warriors are talking about when they talk about “privilege.”

It’s nothing to be ashamed of. And when they rally and shame you over your privilege, they are behaving as a spoiled child behaves when it throws a temper tantrum, and for the same reason. They want you to give them something but they don’t want to give you anything in return. So they resort to moral, emotional and social blackmail, hoping you will give them what they want to leave you alone.

But they never will leave you alone, because as long as this method works, they will never quit using it, never quit making demands, never quit throwing tantrums like bratty children.

Never give in.

Reposted from Eli Harman:
Privilege as a Commons

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Likelihood vs. Frequency

Many people conflate likelihood with frequency. For example, they point out how infrequent Muslim terror attacks are and they make fun of you for even mentioning such an unlikely possibility. There are far more likely ways for you to die, car accident, petty crime, cancer, heart disease, etc… etc… So why are you worried about Islamic terrorism? You’re just an old fuddy duddy, and probably a bigot.

But the likelihood of Muslim terror attacks is not in question. We know now for a certainty that as long as Muslims and westerners continue to mix and mingle, a small but significant minority of Muslims will attack western governments, infrastructure, military, and civilians (but especially civilians) with the aim of inflicting as many casualties or as much damage as possible. Unless something changes, however, those attacks will remain infrequent enough that you probably won’t be caught up in one.

But something IS changing, the number and proportion of Muslims in western nations is changing. The number and proportion of Muslims in western counties is increasing. The ONLY reason anyone mentions the infrequency of their terror attacks (under the duplicitous guise of unlikeliness) is to JUSTIFY increasing their numbers still further. And so the frequency of attacks will rise. And your likelihood of dying or being maimed in one will rise with it.

And if the number and proportion of Muslims in western nations keeps increasing, they will eventually have options other than to engage in random attacks with a near certainty of being caught or killed themselves.

There will be other objects within their reach, supremacy, rule, subjugation, victory. And we can be just as certain that they will reach for those as we are certain now that they will continue to attack us, because that is their aim. They have said so.

This is what those who sow this confusion advocate. This is what those who peddle this lie demand. They have CHOSEN treason to the west and its destruction of their own free will and they have had every reason and opportunity to KNOW that this is what they were choosing.

Whether the west prevails, or Islam, their fate is sealed; unless they repent of their lies and make good the damage they have wrought.


Exterioridad y economía keynesiana en el contexto de la información y decidibilidad.

En la teoría de los precios, exterioridad es un beneficio o pérdida no incluido en el precio del intercambio.

Nosotros podemos debatir si la economía del estudio de inversión producción distribución intercambio y consumo o si la economía es el modelo bajo el cual todas las ciencias sociales desde la metafísica, la psicología, epistemología, la ética, sociología, ley, política, estrategia evolutiva de grupos y conflictos. -Todo el modelo todo espectro filosófico.

Ahí permanece un conflicto entre lo pseudo científico (la epistemología moderna, la psicología freudiana, la sociología boaziana, la ciencia política marxista) y las ciencias sociales científicas que operan todas dentro de la misma rama de investigación que llamamos “economía (estudio de la información, incentivos y cooperación).

Ya que yo entiendo que la economía es una disciplina de ciencias sociales que funciona como una competencia científica ante las seudo ciencias sociales.
Yo trabajo con información en su totalidad, no sólo con los precios-
Yo expando modelos económicos para incluir información de todo tipo las consecuencias en los cambios de esa información

Siento que estoy bastante acertado al afirmar que ésta es la formulación correcta de las reglas generales sobre las cuales debemos trabajar para descubrir en esa disciplina que de forma arcaica llamamos economía

La información es el modelo las ciencias físicas y la información es a su vez el modelo en las ciencias sociales.

El hecho de que Mises, Popper, y Hayek no hayan traído esta idea a fruición, Y por que, es Uno de los grandes fracasos intelectuales de nuestra historia si solo porque permitió que las seudo ciencias que compiten ganen predominancia en la academia Y en consecuencia esas ideas se hayan vuelto políticas.

La exterioridad: en contexto

En el contexto de mi charla Y en el contexto de mis argumentos, no hay diferencia entre los aumentos y disminuciones del capital Y Las transferencias voluntarias o involuntarias de dicho capital, por información en vez de ese subconjunto de información que nosotros llamamos precios.

En otras palabras, la regla general que describen la exterioridad de los precios no es sino un subconjunto de la regla general que describen la exterioridad de toda la información.

Las consecuencias no previstas son cuestión del enfoque de la intención, no una cuestión sobre el enfoque de Las consecuencias de la información.

(si usted entiende de esto yo realmente no requiero una disculpa porque yo estoy al tanto de que este asunto no es trivial. Yo cometo muy pocos errores. Pero siempre estoy constreñido por los límites el tiempo Y las circunstancias yo no puedo explicar cada concepto sobre los cuales apoyo en cada oración que digo. Simplemente lo imposible)

Ahora hablemos sobre el keynesianismo.

Así como yo dependo del información para producir condiciones de decidibilidad, yo también explico las diferencias entre la ley natural (mengeriana/austríaca), el imperio de la ley(Friedman/chicago), y las ramas la ley discrecional (keynes/freshwater) de la teoría económica. En cada uno de tus sistemas teóricos sus creadores dependieron de un método de decidibilidad (o lo que en matemáticas se conoce como el axioma de la elección) para poder justificar el uso de su modelo sobre los otros modelos con los cuales competían.

El grupo de la ley natural asume la posición de no hacer daño (no mentir usando el sistema de precios).

El grupo el imperio de la ley toma la posición que hacer el menor daño posible, de modo tal que no estamos mintiendo Sino corrigiendo problemas de información bajo imperio de la ley. Así que si hay un intercambio entre la desinformación que proveemos Y El sistema de información que llamamos precios e incentivos. Busca restaurar una condición de ley natural.

El grupo de los keynesianos toman la posición de que cualquier desinformación que producimos ahora produce grandes ganancias que no es sólo inmoral resistir usar esa desinformación Sino que poco probable que cualquier consecuencia negativa que produzcamos será superada por ganancias inter temporales, te podemos reparar esos problemas que causamos luego con las ganancias.

Bajo este modelo economía, la decidibilidad en teoría económica que no es provista por modelos axiomático es provista por axiomas de elección: por ejemplo: valoración subjetiva.

Este asunto de la decidibilidad no ha sido resuelto aún, sin embargo la idea general austriaca de que no podemos hacer trampa de facto, parece ser correcta por el hecho de que la duración Y severidad de las depresiones económicas es cada vez mayor. Ésta es la razón por la cual el debate se ha calmado tanto desde la crisis del 2008. El establishment depende de la decidibilidad keynesiana para justificar aumentos en la tasa de consumo a expensas de la degradación normativa, genética, e institucional del capital, bajo en la sumir que es posible alcanzar la igualdad genética, normativa, Y posiblemente institucional. Lo cual si lo vemos esa forma claramente falso.

Sólo ha sido desde el abandono mundial de la economía marxista, Y la aceptación mundial del capitalismo consumidor Y del crédito fiduciario, que la ventaja tecnológica de la civilización occidental nos ha podido dejar asumir que la tendencia del crecimiento constante está disponible para nosotros sin consecuencias Inter temporales.

Keynesianismo en el contexto de la decidibilidad

Así que, cuando yo hablo del keynesianismo, ese Es el método de decidibilidad al cual yo me refiero.

De nuevo, yo tiendo a no cometer errores. Yo cometo muchos errores de brevedad, tiene muchas consecuencias no previstas por mi brevedad. Pero toda la comunicación en común requiere de perdida de información O su carga nos silenciará.


Traducido por Alberto R ZambranoU
disponible en


La Respuesta correcta a la pregunta: ¿Que son los Derechos Humanos?

Las palabras y frases que buscan responder a esta interrogante demuestran la tragedia de la educación de finales del siglo XX.
Por lo cual se requieren de definiciones correctas y necesarias.

Los derechos son obligaciones contractuales de una parte para abstenerse de llevar a cabo ciertas acciones: Dejar pasar oportunidades en detrimento de ganancias.
Los derechos negativos: Son obligaciones contractuales de una parte para llevar a cabo acciones: asumir costos, y dejar pasar oportunidades por abandono (por ejemplo: cometer un fraude)
Los derechos existenciales: Los derechos sólo existen cuando:
Se obtienen en intercambios contractuales
Se puede obligar su cumplimento en asuntos de disputa por medio de un tercero, un “asegurador”. 

A lo largo de la historia, el gobierno ha sido el asegurador en última instancia.

Los derechos no existen. Su existencia es creada por la construcción de un asegurador que usualmente es el gobierno.

Los derechos deseados: Son aquellos que deseas poseer si puedes conseguir
Alguien que desee realizar intercambios contigo
Un asegurador que garantice que esos derechos serán cumplidos una vez que los hayas negociado.

La Jerarquía de los derechos:

Normativa: Normas, maneras, formas, procederes, ética y moralidad
Contractual: Será explicada a fondo en otro post.
Derechos políticos
La ley propiamente dicha
La legislación
Las regulaciones
4. Los derechos humanos: Son ínter-estatales. Los derechos humanos son un intento por parte de las naciones occidentales en el mundo post-colonial y de la post-guerra para fijar los términos por los cuales los gobiernos habrían de respetar la soberanía (es decir las fronteras espaciales) de otros gobiernos.
En otras palabras, son un intento de prevenir los horrores de los países primitivos y en vías de desarrollo, contener al comunismo, constreñir los gobiernos expansionistas, y fijar el propósito del gobierno para el mejoramiento de las condiciones de vida de sus ciudadanos.

5. Los derechos naturales: Son científicamente necesarios, y son aquellos derechos necesarios para la evolución de la organización voluntaria de la producción de bienes y servicios (capitalismo) en la ausencia de parasitismo y depredación por organizaciones públicas o privadas. Todos los derechos naturales son derechos negativos, ya que nosotros sólo podemos abstenernos por igual de llevar a cabo ciertas acciones, por el hecho de que somos desiguales para actuar, y de la misma forma, no podemos, por nuestra desigualdad ser capaces de actuar. Y no podemos controlar los recursos necesarios para nuestras acciones. 

Los derechos humanos son derechos necesarios- aquellos necesarios para que la libertad humana esté protegida de depredadores – que cualquier gobierno que busque producir para sus ciudadanos (es decir actuar como un proveedor) si ese gobierno desea preservar su soberanía de acciones contra él debe ser firmante del contrato de los derechos humanos. Son los aseguradores en última instancia.
Todos los derechos humanos son expresarles como derechos recíprocos de propiedad.
Todos los derechos naturales son expresarles como derechos de propiedad que recíprocamente se garantizan unos a otros.
Los derechos contra la no imposición de costos contra la vida, libertad y propiedad son derechos naturales.

Ésta fue la fraseología original de la constitución de los Estados Unidos.

Todos los códigos morales pueden ser expresados como derechos de propiedad, porque esas acciones no son conocidas por las partes beneficiadas y se benefician de ellas.
Todos los códigos éticos pueden ser expresados como derechos de propiedad porque esas acciones entre partes involucradas se ven beneficiadas en una distribución asimétrica.

La diferencia entre los derechos humanos (políticos) y los derechos naturales.

Es científica: Los comunistas crearon una serie de “derechos” por medio de juntar firmas y votarlas en una serie de elecciones no-auténticas, el resultado fue el nacimiento de una mentira: los derechos positivos. Estos derechos no pueden ser asegurados sin violar todos los otros derechos. 
Es por ello que esos derechos no existen ni pueden existir.

Los únicos derechos que podemos garantizar son los derechos negativos porque sólo los podemos poseer de forma igual para tener la habilidad de abstenernos de realizar ciertas acciones.

Nosotros podemos crear y organizar gobiernos para poder crear derechos de propiedad. Podemos crear un asegurador de nuestra existencia (nuestra vida), libertad (acción) y propiedad (inventario).

Todo lo demás que digamos sobre este tipo de cosas es de alguna forma, un colorido engaño

Curt Doolittle

El Instituto Propietarista

Traducción de Alberto R. Zambrano U.

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¿Por que me importa la clase trabajadora?

Porque nosotros somos compatibles, y necesitamos el uno del otro.

Alguno de nosotros trabajamos, otros trabajamos en gerencia, algunos calculamos y diseñamos, algunos de nosotros organizamos, y algunos otros decidimos qué organizar, calcular, diseñar, administrar y sobre que cosas trabajar.

Es cuando nosotros determinamos de forma exitosa un método por el cual cada uno de nosotros se beneficia al cooperar con el resto, en vez de cooperar con otros al competir por oportunidades para hacer trabajos, administración, cálculos, organización y decisión que no somos sólo compatibles sino necesarios el uno para el otro.

La aristocracia opera de forma empírica: Por medio de la compatibilidad.
La compatibilidad en la reproducción (la unidad familiar como una unidad reproductiva), en materia de defensa (la jerarquía del mando), en producción (la jerarquía de la organización de la producción), y en política (la jerarquía de las clases) mientras preservamos y mantenemos la participación voluntaria en la selección de parejas, al unir ejércitos, al participar en la fuerza laboral, y entre las distintas divisiones de los poderes del estado.

La compatibilidad voluntaria es un método que sirve para poder “calcular” el resultado óptimo de Nash sobre la marcha.

El modelo de la aristocracia occidental fue científico. Hasta el siglo XX.

A mi me importa la clase trabajadora porque ELLOS SON LOS QUE PELEAN. ¿Por que? Porque las élites crean la diferencia competitiva para las clases trabajadoras, y si ellas pelean por sus élites, y eligen las élites correctas, entonces tendrán que vivir bajo mejores condiciones que otras clases que eligen ser gobernados por élites peores.

El problema con la forma de vida americana es que los socialistas creen que han hecho una franquicia exitosa a partir de la apropiación del movimiento de los trabajadores y han convertido compatibilidad en incompatibilidad.

Los socialistas eligieron dividirnos y conquistarnos, obligando a nuestras élites a abandonar a sus clases trabajadoras.

Si queremos una revolución, debemos actuar de forma compatible. Debemos tener élites que decidan y organicen, clases medias que calculen y teoricen, y clases trabajadoras que administren y actúen.

Mi nombre es Legión. Y somos muchos

Curt Doolittle.
La Filosofía de la Aristocracia
El Instituto Propietarista.

Traducido por Alberto R. Zambrano U.


El espectro de la moralidad: De la certidumbre al descubrimiento

Algunos conflictos son objetivamente inmorales, ya que generan venganza.

Algunos conflictos son condicionalmente inmorales porque violan los contratos normativos que consisten en el producto (resultado) de un conjunto de intercambios en lugar de acciones individuales.

Algunos conflictos son morales tales como la competencia por las oportunidades producidas por el mercado.

Algunos conflictos son inciertos ya que constituyen un proceso de descubrimiento.

Traducido por Alberto R. Zambrano U.
Texto original

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Un par de reflexiones sobre Vladimir Putin desde el propietarismo

Vladimir Putin ha hecho mucho por su pueblo y no podemos subestimar esa labor. Debemos respetar y admirarle por el cambio en la calidad de vida de los rusos desde que llegó al poder.

Putin tuvo su visión de restaurar:

  1. El enfoque del imperio Ruso
  2. La civilización ortodoxa.

Putin también tiene mucho miedo, no por si mismo, sino por su pueblo y su futuro. Ellos no tienen ni la economía ni la población para retornar al gran estatus de poder en el siglo XXI. Mientras se ha mejorado el orden en el país, y el imperio de la ley ha mejorado -suficientemente-.

Rusia aun posee una economía basada en recursos naturales que no se ha diversificado, un servicio secreto que maneja el contrabando de armas y estupefacientes.
Putin depende de los Chechenos como ejecutores de sus acciones y está rodeado (al mejor estilo de un padrino de la mafia) por aquellos que lo reemplazarían con mucha alegría.
Antes de que la Federación Rusa anexara la provincia de Crimea, Vladimir Putin quizá era el político más influyente y respetado del mundo.

Cuando los ciudadanos ucranianos lograron deshacerse del régimen títere de Yanukóvich que le negó a su pueblo la posibilidad de formar parte de la Unión Europea, en Moscú y San Petersburgo hubo protestas y cantos en todas partes diciendo que Rusia estaba próxima a unirse al mundo occidental.

Pero Putin ve a los espías americanos y su manipulación en todas partes, mientras que los americanos ven a sus políticos, embajadores, personal consular, servicios de inteligencia y organizaciones no gubernamentales como un montón de payasos incompetentes.

Putin creyó en el títere de Yanukóvich.

Mientras que los jóvenes en la calles, habiendo perdido a sus familiares y amigos, estaban alzados, y posiblemente matarían a Yanukóvich en caso de encontrarle, Putin envió a sus fuerzas especiales a buscar a Yanukóvich y lo trasladaron a su avión presidencial cargado de dinero y se embarcó hacia Dubai, para luego terminar en Rusia.

Así que Putin pudo haber perdido un puerto como Crimea ante los ojos de la OTAN pero no lo hizo. Lo anexó ante los ojos de todo el mundo.

Y mientras lo hizo reparó y modernizó las fuerzas armadas rusas, pero todas esas mejoras se hicieron en fábricas e industrias que pertenecieron a Ucrania.

Putin pudo haber llamado a los líderes de la UE, al Reino Unido y Estados Unidos y haber pactado una adquisición por los próximos cien años sobre la soberanía rusa sobre Crimea, haber argüido que es un problema e interés estratégico para su país el controlar dicho territorio y que más nadie sino él tiene el don de mando para ejercer poder sobre ese espacio geográfico. Pero no lo hizo. Simplemente anexó esa provincia ucraniana ante los ojos de occidente.

No importa lo que digan en realidad porque Vladimir Putin hace una alusión y le dice a los ucranianos que está orgullosos de ellos pero les ofrece un 20% de descuento en el precio del gas a cambio de un siglo de dominación rusa sobre Crimea.
Esto tiene como consecuencia que los habitantes de esa zona tendrán seguridad laboral (por lo que sus trabajos de minería y manufactura están intactos), obtendrán pensiones y seguridad social rusa, y lo que queda de la Ucrania no anexada podrá tener la oportunidad de financiar su programa de modernización.

Rusia envía a sus tropas al territorio anexado y lo hace porque:

  1. Los ucranianos ven a a los rusos como unos degenerados que se aferran al sueño del comunismo.
  2. Los ucranianos sólo van a Crimea a vacacionar (igual que los rusos)
  3. El precio del gas es una carga para un país tan pobre como Ucrania.

Ahora, parte de la razón por la cual tenemos este problema entre occidente y Rusia es que los rusos son incapaces de admitir su vulnerabilidad en ese tipo de asuntos.

Así como Putin se acercó a los EEUU para comentar ciertos aspectos de la membresía en la OTAN, y los estadounidenses fueron estúpidos al respecto, Putin simplemente no envió ese mensaje a los americanos en general y se los explicó.
De la misma forma que el asunto de Crimea no fue explicado a los líderes mundiales.
De la misma forma que no se les explicó a los ucranianos.

Yo pienso que es incomprensible para un ruso que los americanos sean tan ingenuos sobre los ideales utópicos, pero que realmente crean que con respecto a Crimea se está haciendo lo correcto, a pesar de la abrumadora evidencia en contra.
Perso así como los Israelitas han demostrado que si llevas un problema a los americanos para que lo resuelvan por medio de la prensa; estás esperando obtener algo a cambio.  (No les ha ido bien con eso).

Así que yo veo que Putin, en términos generales es un hombre que está viendo cómo su mundo colapsa, su pueblo sufre, y se ve a sí mismo com el héroe que puede restaurar a su país y su mundo, y poder quedar en los anales de la historia rusa como un modelo a seguir.

Putin tiene un problema: No vende, sólo ofrece.

Y ningún ministro del gabinete de Putin puede “vender” la postura rusa internacional. Ni siquiera Sergei Lavrov.

Lo cual es jodidamente racional.

Curt Doolittle
Kiev. Ucrania
El Instituto Propietarista

Traducido por Alberto R. Zambrano U.

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Externalities And Keynesian Economics In Context Of Information And Decidability


In price-theory, an externality is any benefit or loss not included in the price of the exchange.

But we can debate whether economics is the study of investment, production, distribution, trade, and consumption, or whether economics is the model under which all social science, from metaphysics, to psychology, to epistemology, to ethics, sociology, law, politics, group evolutionary strategy, and conflict – the entire model for the entire philosophical spectrum.

There remains a conflict between the pseudoscientific(postmodern epistemology, freudian psychology, boazian sociology, marxist political science,) and the scientific social sciences all operating within the single branch of inquiry we call “economics”. (the study of information, incentives, and cooperation).

Since I do understand that economics as a discipline of social science functions as the scientific competitor to the pseudoscientific social sciences, I work with INFORMATION in total, not with PRICES alone. And I extend economic models to include INFORMATION of all kinds, and the consequences of changes in information.

I am fairly certain that this is the CORRECT (meaning true) framing for the general rules which we work to discover in that discipline we ‘archaically’ call economics.

Information is the model in the physical sciences, and information is likewise the model in the social sciences. The fact that Mises, Popper and Hayek did not quite bring this idea to fruition, and why, is one of the great intellectual failings of history – if only because it allowed the competing pseudosciences to gain predominance in our academy and as a consequence, policy.

In the context of my talk, and in the context of my arguments, there is no difference between the increases or decreases in capital, and the voluntary or involuntary transfers of that capital, by INFORMATION rather than that SUBSET of information that we call PRICES.

In other words, the general rule describing the externalities of prices is but a subset of the general rule describing the externalities of all information.

And unintended consequences are a question of scope of INTENTION, not a question of the scope of the consequences of INFORMATION.

(if you understand this I don’t really require an apology because I realize this is non-trivial material. I make very few errors. But I am always constrained by the limits of time and circumstance and I cannot explain every concept that I rely upon in every utterance I make. It’s just not possible. )

Just as I rely on information to produce conditions of DECIDABILITY, I also explain the differences between the natural law (mengerian/austrian), rule of law (friedmanite/chicago), and discretionary rule (keynesian/freshwater) branches of economic theory. In each of these theoretical systems the originators relied upon a method of decidability (or what in math is called ‘axiom of choice’) in order to justify the use of their model over the competing models.

The Natural Law group takes the position of do no harm (do not ‘lie’ using the pricing system).

The Rule of Law group takes the position of do as little harm as possible, so that we are not lying but ‘correcting’ information problems under rule of law. So that there is a trade between the disinformation we provide and the information system we call prices and incentives. It seeks to restore a condition of natural law.

The Discretionary Rule group (Keynesians) take the position that any disinformation we produce now, produces such profound gains, that it’s not only immoral to resist using disinformation, but that its unlikely that any negative consequences we produce would be outweighed by intertemporal gains, that we can fix those problems we cause later on with the proceeds.

Under this model of economics, decidability in economic theory that is not provided by the axiomatic model is provided by an axiom of choice: ie: subjective valuation.

This issue of decidability is not solved yet although the general austrian prescription that we cannot in fact ‘cheat’, seems to be correct given the increasing duration and severity of depressions. This is why the debate has calmed so significantly since 2008’s crisis. The mainstream relies upon keyensian decidability to justify increased rates of consumption at the expense of genetic, normative, and institutional capital degradation, under the assumption of genetic, normative, and (possible) institutional equality.
(which if stated this way, is clearly false).

It has only been since the worldwide abandonment of marxist economics, and the worldwide adoption of consumer capitalism, and fiat credit, that the west’s asymmetrical technological advantage let us assume that the trend of constant growth was available to us without intertemporal consequences.


So, when I spoke of Keynesianism it is the method of decidability that I was referring to.

Again, I tend not to make mistakes. I make many mistakes of brevity, and there are many unintended consequences of my brevity. But all common communication requires information loss or the burden would silence us.


Curt Doolittle 
The Philosophy of Aristocracy
The Propertarian Institute