MISES POSITION IN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY?
(reposted from elsewhere) (I think this will blow your mind a little bit.)

Mises Human Action as Cosmopolitan Stoicism.

He was almost right. If Rothbard and the Rothbardians had not damaged his legacy so severely, he would not be ostracized by the main stream intellectual community. At present any mention of his name associates a public intellectual, an economist, or philosopher, with the pseudoscientific lunatic fringe.

Praxeology is a failed attempt at Operationalism, sure – but no one ELSE came close to developing economic operationalism but Mises. I only did it because I have the luxury of a century of additional development in computability (especially Turing), and because it’s clear now that the analytic program (attempt to convert philosophy into a science) has been a failure, and that the success in reforming both science and psychology has almost entirely been because of Operationalism.

Had Mises joined with Brouwer and Bridgman, the three of them might have saved us from a century of pseudoscience. But without a philosopher of ethics to unify them, Popper in the philosophy of science, Mises in Economics, Brouwer in mathematics, and Bridgman in physics all failed to come to the correct conclusion: that they were not in fact articulating logical constraints – because there is no logical constraint to theory-development. The logical constraint is only in the statement of promise (that you are telling the truth) that such a theory can be expressed existentially, as a sequence of operations (actions) or operational measures of observations. And as such, one’s theory, in any discipline, is free of content that was added by error, imagination, or deception. Man can testify to observation in the execution of recipes – all else is imagination. As such the practice of the sciences (or rather, the practice of *disciplined testimony* which the sciences developed, but which consists of nothing unique to the physical sciences) is a moral one, with ethical constraints.

As such, praxeology, mathematical intuitionism, operationalism, operationism, Popper’s critical preference, and the scientific method, as well as the discipline of science as currently practiced, are moral constraints, not logical ones. One can intuit a theory by whatever means possible. One can believe whatever he wishes to justify. But one’s promise of testimony to the actions that did or may produce consequences is a moral one, not a logical one.

As far as I know, the only meaningful reason to study economics for use in ethics and politics, is to justify the rule of law (Nomocracy), under the single rule of property rights, where property rights is as defined under Propertarianism, as property-en-toto (demonstrated property). And where that body of law suppresses sufficient involuntary transfer of property-en-toto, that the formation of a Nomocratic polity is possible. And where the formation and perpetuation of that polity is possible, because transaction costs are sufficiently suppressed that a rational choice for Nomocracy is possible, over a rational choice for statism. And that the normative preference of nomocratic rule over statist rule is maintained by the constant exercise of that body of law in daily life, rather than a phillosophical-rational, religio-moral, pedagogically-instructional, or normatively-habituated means of persistence.

If we look at his human action as an attempt to develop an economic version of stoicism – a mental discipline – I think it is probably a better frame of reference for his work than as economics or analytic philosophy.
As such I see him as creating a Cosmopolitan version of stoicism (economic/intellectual character) rather than western (Aryan if you will) stoicism (political/craftsmanship character).

Both forms of stoicism are early attempts at operationalizing philosophy for disciplinary action as an individual member of a complex division of labor in which we possess fragmentary information.

Since I quote him endlessly for his analysis of money and fiduciary media, which again, he (“a sequence of human actions” = “operational observations”) correctly uses operational analysis to isolate and articulate the causal rather than normative properties – I am clearly an advocate. But I am not an advocate of the misuse of Mises’ errors – his failed attempt to develop economic operationalism – to justify Rothbardian libertinism – an outright assault on the production of both high trust, and the commons – both of which are the primary competitive advantages constituent in the western indo-european (Aryan if you will) evolutionary strategy.

I walk by Mises’ childhood home every day. It has tempered my criticism. I see him making natural errors of Cosmopolitanism – as Hayek said “a victim of his upbringing”. Just as the Germans have made endless errors in conflating religion and philosophy to preserve their hierarchy and duty as a group competitive strategy. Just as British (Anglo/Irish/Scots if not the Belgae) have fought to preserve their island universalism despite the necessary suicide that results from universalism outside of their island (or the american island, or the Australian island.)

I will venture this post is one of the more important things that has been written about Mises in recent history, and my arguments, if not my criticisms will assist us in RESCUING Mises from the lunatic fringe, and RESCUING his work for use in intellectual discourse – as the first attempt at saving Economics through operationalism, the way that science and psychology (if not also mathematics and logic) have been saved by operationalism.

**I see myself as rescuing ALL of the Misesian/Hoppeian program from the fruitcake fringe: by laundering German, Jewish and British enlightenment fallacies – the attempt to universalize local evolutionary strategy – rather than simply adopt scientific epistemology (operationalism) as the only neutral tool for the use of studying group evolutionary strategies.**

Although it is, I am sure, somewhat difficult for those religiously devoted to immoral, libertine, Rothbardianism to either understand or accept.

I am quite sure I do not err in this analysis. A statement which I am aware further taunts libertines. But which my fellow aristocrats (libertarians-proper) both understand and expect from me as a promise. Because the anglo-empirical model of truth telling, quite opposite from the cosmopolitan, is that truth is the name for testimony. And as such I testify that to the best of my knowledge my statement is true. And that I bear the reputational consequences of my promise that this statement is true. This is the polar opposite of the Popperian, Analytic, and Cosmopolitan version of true: that truth is the unknowable province of god alone, and as such we can only ‘do what we can’, and as such are unaccountable for our words.

This ethic, this definition of truth, as performative – as operational, is what Kant was searching for, but could not find. And it is why both Jewish and German philosophy are dead ends. And it is why english philosophy became lost through its influence by the germans and the cosmopolitans.

We lost a century of philosophy to cosmopolitan pseudoscience in economics, politics, ethics and logic. Germans lost centuries to pseudo-philosophical religio-moralism. Mises can be seen in context as the most successful – if still failed – attempt to rescue german and cosmopolitan thought from its religious constraints.

– Cheers.

Curt Doolittle
The Philosophy of Aristocracy
The Propertarian Institute
Kiev Ukraine

 

(the central concept of propertarianism)

Of Haidt’s evolutionary origins of moral intuitions, three can be expressed as individual property rights:

1. Care/harm for others, protecting them from harm. (The asset of life and body.)
2. Proportionality/cheating, Justice, treating others in proportion to their actions. (The asset of goods.)
3. Liberty/Oppression, characterizes judgments in terms of whether subjects are tyrannized. (The asset of time, opportunity.)

And three others can be expressed as community property rights covering social capital. Which obviously enough, have been, and continue to be, mirrored in corporate shareholder agreements.

4. In-Group Loyalty/In-Group Betrayal to/of your group, family, nation, polity.
5. Respect/Authority/Subversion for tradition and legitimate authority.
6. Purity/Sanctity/Degradation/Disgust, avoiding disgusting things, foods, actions.

It should be noted that the male reproductive strategy among chimpanzees as well as humans evolved to kill off males in opposing groups and collect females. And that females evolved to place greater emphasis on children and females than the (fungible) tribe.

As such the distribution of moral intuitions varies in intensity between the feminine (1-3) and the masculine (4-6). This difference in moral intuitions roughly reflects the voting pattern we have seen since the enfranchisement of women into the electorate: an increase in the use of political violence to produce an increase in the female reproductive strategy (individual dysgenic reproduction) and a decrease in the male reproductive strategy (tribal eugenic reproduction).

When I first read a paper by Jonathan Haidt, years ago now, I immediately understood the implication.  Just as the ten commandments are reducible to “There is but one law: property, and thou shalt not steal”, all our moral rules can be reduced to one: “thou shalt not steal directly or indirectly, by action or inaction.”  These rules are genetic in origin.  They are necessary and immutable.

 

(worth repeating)

The central proposition of neo-reaction is that the enlightenment was dangerously optimistic about humans, human nature, and the state; and that as a consequence, society is just as religious as ever it was, with an official state religion of progressivism: the promise of an aristocracy of everyone. It is another “good-news” religion, telling us what we wish to hear, but about this world instead of the next.

Instead of the church teaching supernatural analogy, we have academia, public intellectuals and the state all preaching the new religion of progressivism. And this new religion, is an evil religion: pseudoscientific rather than supernatural, irrational rather than logical, dishonest rather than allegorical, consumptive and destructive rather than accumulative, dysgenic rather than evolutionary, and suicidal rather than exceptional.

And so, western philosophy didn’t go wrong four years ago, or ten years ago, or eighty years ago – but it went fundamentally and terribly wrong over three centuries ago, with the enlightenment.

We had already evolved the best form of government yet devised: a market for production of private goods and services, and a house for each of the classes to produce common goods and services we cannot produce in the market alone.

And our only significant error was to fail to grasp that the church: the representative of the common people, served as one of those houses of government, and should not have been separate from the other two: the long term interests of the martial land owners, the medium term interests of entrepreneurial banking, production and trade. Instead, we handed the aristocracy and commerce to the new church: the academy and its priesthood the public intellectuals. America is ruled by a theocracy.

The central problem of any post-hunter-gatherer society, engaged in production, is to ensure that the fecundity of the unproductive does not eradicate the increases in productivity of the creative – but that those increases are accumulated as a competitive advantage against the fecundity of not only our own relations, but of those who would replace us. Otherwise all innovation is translated into population expansion rather than advancement. Northern european civilization succeeded faster than all others, in no small part because it concentrated reproduction in its upper classes, not in expanding the burden of its lower classes.

Neo-reaction then, is an articulate and accurate criticism of the enlightenment and its evidentiary failure culminating in the late 20th century – including the rejection of the ideology by the adoption of totalitarian consumer capitalism everywhere other than the west. Propertarianism, including Aristocratic Egalitarianism, Testimonial Truth and Operationalism provide the logical and institutional solution to the problem of cooperation among competing interests we call ‘politics’, that the Enlightenment, and Neo-Reaction did not.

 

(the central argument)( profound)

The central argument regarding truth:

1) … is that giving witness to one’s observations, is testable by reproduction of a set of operational definitions. That operational definitions produce the equivalent of names, just as positional numbering provides quantities with names. Such names are insulated from deception, distraction, loading, framing and overloading. Theories are not. While we cannot demonstrate the absolute parsimony of a theory (that we know of), we can demonstrate that we truthfully conveyed our observations. In other words, we can testify truthfully to an ordered set of facts, even if we cannot testify truthfully to parsimony of a theory.

2) … that physical science is a narrow and special case of human activity, and popper was defining truth for that special case – a definition which is not applicable outside of the special case, and even inside the special case, he made questionable use of the term in order to retain its moral loading for purely social reasons. Justifiable social reasons, but social reasons none the less.

3) ….that it is possible to state instead that all outputs of scientific investigation are true, if they are truthfully represented – where ‘scientific investigation” refers to the use of the scientific method, regardless of field of inquiry. But that we seek the most parsimonious statement of a theory, and we can never know that we have obtained it, we can only develop consensus that we cannot cause it to fail. This is, as far as I know, the best non-platonic description of truth available. Everything else is a linguistic contrivance for one purpose or another – possibly to obscure ignorance, and possibly to load ideas with moral motivation. Scientists load their contrivance of truth, and mathematicians load their contrivance of numbers, limits, and a dozen other things – most of which obscure linguistic ‘cheats’ to give authority to that which is necessary for the construction of general rules. (ie: the problem of arbitrary precision).

4) … that popper did no investigation into science or the history of science prior to making his argument, and that as yet, we do not have a systematic account of the history of science. However, what history we do have, both distant and recent, is that science operates as I have suggested: by criticism upon failure via overextension. The reason being that it is economically inefficient (expensive) to pursue criticism rather than to extend a theory to its point of failure then criticize it. And as far as we know, this is how science works, and must work, because it is how all human endeavors must work. Because while a small number of scientists may seek the ‘truth’ whatever a platonist means, what scientists try to do is solve problems – ie: to manufacture recipes for useful cognition.

5) … that popper’s advice was merely moral given that the scale of inquiry in all human fields had surpassed that of human scale, where tests are subjectively verifiable. (I think this is an important insight because it occurred in all fields.) Einstein for example, operationalized observations (relative simultaneity for example) over very great distances approaching the speed of light using Lorenz transformations. And as Bridgman demonstrated, the reason Einstein’s work was novel was because prior generations had NOT been operationalizing statements ,and as such, more than a generation and perhaps two were lost to failure of what should have been an obvious solution. (See the problem of length, which I tend to refer to often as the best example.) I addressed this in a previous post, and what popper did was give us good advice, and while he made an argument that appears logical, like most rational arguments, unsupported by data, it is not clear he was correct, and in fact, it appears that he was not. The question is not a rational but empirical one.

6) … and I am not terribly interested in criticizing popper, any more than criticizing any other philosopher I admire, since popper unlike Misesian Pseudoscience, or Rothbardian Immoral Verbalisms, was engaged in a moral attempt both in politics and in science, and perhaps in science as a vehicle for politics, to prevent the pseudoscientific use of science – particularly by fascist and communists, to use the findings of science as a replacement for divine authority by which to command man. What popper did, particularly with his platonism, was to remove the ability for the findings of science to be used as justification for the removal of human choice. Popper, Mises, and Hayek were responsible for undermining pseudoscientific authoritarianism. Of the three popper is perhaps less articulate (possibly to obscure his objective), but certainly not wrong, so to speak. While mises’ appeal to authoritarianism (which is part and parcel of jewish culture) was entirely pseudoscientific, by claiming that economics was deductive rather than empirical, and justifying it under apriorism, instead of as I’ve stated, understanding that he was merely trying to apply operationalism to economic activity, which would merely demonstrate that Keynesian economics was immoral, not unscientific.

But Popper, Mises, Hayek, Bridgman and Brouwer, did not find a solution to restoring the western aristocratic conditions for public speech.
They too were a lost in platonism a bit. Bridgman and Brouwer did understand that something was wrong, and were very close,b ut they could not make the moral argument. We have had a century now of attacks by verbal contrivance and we can demonstrate the destruction of our civilization by way of it. So the moral argument is no longer one of undemonstrated results. WE have the results. And we have a generation of men, myself included, trying to repair it.

One must speak truthfully, because no other truth is knowable. Intellectual products that are brought to market must be warrantied just as are all other products that are brought to market, and the warranty that you can provide is operational definitions (recipes, experience), not theories (psychologism, projections). And if you are not willing to stand behind your product then you should not bring it to market. Because you have no right to subject others to harm.

Intellectuals produce ideas (myself included), that is our product. We are paid in measly terms most of the time, for our product, but that is what we do. But it is no different from hot coffee or dangerous ladders, or defective gas tanks.

And given that one particularly prolific group of people has created marxism, socialism, postmodernism, libertine-libertarianism, and neoconservatism, it is about time we stopped allowing them to ship lousy products into society.

And rather than regulate them by government, the common law and universal standing will allow punishment of those who bring bad products to market.

OBSCURITY
I am entirely capable (as above) of writing clearly, but it is tedious when most logical connections appear to be obvious to the informed person. I will cop out to being lazy, particularly when I have no idea whether the others involved in the debate will be worthwhile. But it’s not that I can’t drill down to necessary arguments. OK? It’s just a lot more work than incrementally testing an idea and making sure that others follow the breadcrumbs….

CLOSING
I am pretty sure the above analysis is correct. It’s going to be very hard to demonstrate otherwise: that popper used a pragmatic theory of truth, just like all of us do. But there is only one possible extant truth, and that is testimony. All else is but moral rule, not logical necessity. OK? That’s just how it is. Period, end of story.

Curt Doolittle
The Philosophy of Aristocracy
The Propertarian Institute
Kiev, Ukraine

 

(important)(profound)

I have been working to reform anarcho capitalist arguments by translating them from troublesome Kantian rationalism, into the transparent common language of science: ratio-empiricism. And, at least for the past few months, I’ve been struggling to develop a narrative structure that would allow me to easily demonstrate the solution to the promise of praxeology as a failed version of the same problems addressed by Intuitionism, Operationalism and Constructivism in mathematics and science.

Mises’ work was another example of the multi-disciplinary failure to provide a solution to the common intuition that there is a problem with science and mathematics, and our application of science and math to other fields – particularly to economics and ethics. That is the conclusion that I have come to – it’s the logical positioning of Mises’ praxeology in the development of 20th century thought – albeit he was even less successful in economics than peers were in physics, math, logic and psychology. They were able to identify the solution but not able to convince peers to implement it, because it was burdensome.

This narrative, positioning Misesian thought as a failed attempt at Operationalism in human cooperation, provides a vehicle whereby I can describe Misesian arguments in the same context as those in physics, psychology, logic and mathematics. All of them as failed experiments in operationalism only because the authors did not and possibly could not look across disciplines and discover that they were merely adding or removing the properties desirable or not for their field of inquiry – but that while they were seeking a logical solution, that they were all making similar arguments – ethical arguments: And that the problem they intuited, that Poincaré criticized them for, was an ethical one: recreating mysticism through the use of verbalism to obscure causality that they did not understand.

All the major disciplines went through a somewhat failed transformation and only psychology, which was most in need of reformation, fully adopted operationalism as “operationism”. And the result was a wealth of research in experimental psychology and the success of experimental psychology versus the pseudoscience that dominated the field before hand.

Why is this important? Because the requirements for construction and operational language, are not only logical but ethical. And while ethics has limited place in mathematical principles, and physical laws, it has a great significance to the promise that one is advocating a truth in mathematical and physical propositions – and therefore not ‘polluting’ the intellectual domain with fallacies that might impact others’ work. But in the logic of cooperation we call ethics it is inseparable both from the promise that one is advocating a truth AND in the articulation of its principles and the laws that enforce those principles.

If we had discovered operationalism in ethics first, then perhaps, we would have had an easier time justifying the additional burden that operationalism places upon physics, science, psychology math and logic – and we might have saved a century of pseudoscientific inquiry, just as Bridgman worried; and just as we have seen in a century of fallacious and immoral economics. As Bridgman noted, the only reason Einstein was innovative, was because he operationalized the problem of measurement of bodies – something that had we done earlier would have saved a generation or more of wasted effort in science – just as we have wasted a generation or more in the pursuit of a logic of cooperation leading to liberty.

The issue for us, in economics, politics and in ethics, is that the problem of arbitrary precision in the construction of general rules – hypothesis, theories and laws – affects only the precision of economic laws in time, but not our ability to state those laws. However, unlike say, mathematics or logic, we never run into decidability in the logic of cooperation, because all phenomenon are reducible to human actions that are open to subjective testing (sympathetic experience). Unlike axiomatic systems such as math and logic, we are never short of information necessary for decidability. Humans are marginally indifferent in their preferences – which is why we can experience shared intent, cooperate, and empathize. As such we can always decide. Buridan’s Ass never starves. Information is always sufficient. It may not be sufficient for the choice of preference, but it is sufficient for rational choice. Again, arguments that someone versed in mathematical philosophy might have understood. Although, with decades of computer science, we have learned that it’s computer science that is more trustworthy than mathematics, because computers are constrained by operational rules of necessity, and unlike mathematics we cannot use imagination and ‘fudging’ obscured by verbalism. Operations must be open to performance and results must be computable.

To counter the problem of imagination adding information to arguments, and the problem of using verbalism to obscure ignorance, under operationalism and constructivism, **truth is replaced by (algorithmic) proof as a primitive notion, and existence requires demonstration of constructibility.** This statement is possible to translate into the axiom that moral (ethical) propositions must be reducible to a series of human actions, open to subjective testing (sympathetic verification).

This is the argument that mises was looking for, and could not construct, possibly because (a) he lacked sufficient understanding of mathematics, (b) he lacked a demonstrably insufficient understanding of the terms ‘scientific’ and ‘logical’, because he conflated them with abandon, despite their opposite properties, and (c) because an ethical constraint was insufficient to provide an authoritative response to the moral arguments of statists and socialists alike. Whether he understood the ethical constraint not the logical one was all that a solution to praxeological analysis would provide, or simply, like most cosmopolitans, because preferred an authoritarian, verbalist, and pseudoscientific argument is something it is impossible to answer in our era. Since Marx, Freud, Cantor, Mises and Rothbard all make the same error of constructing verbal pseudosciences, it’s hard to imagine that it’s intentional rather than a cultural bias or strategy. (Something I have written about elsewhere under the heading of competing uses of truth.)

The problem I face, and the work I must do, to help others understand Mises’ position in intellectual history, and his failure, and then to construct a logic of cooperation, where Mises mistakenly tries to construct a logic of ‘action’ is to enumerate examples of axioms and laws in different fields and thereby demonstrate the problem of the sufficiency of information for deduction under arbitrary precision in the construction of hypotheses, theories, laws, and axioms; and then placing Mises’ work in the context of all fields struggling with the definition of truth (as ultimately performative – and therefore ethical). So positioning economics and ethics using performative truth, operationalism and constructivism will help demonstrate the concept across ALL domains of inquiry, rather than just within economics, ethics, physics, psychology, mathematics and logic. And thus eliminate the objections to performative truth, intuitionism, constructivism, and operationalism by demonstrating that all philosophical and logical disciplines rest upon the action that one claims to have demonstrated a an action that he can testify truthfully to have observed (rather than imagined, or used verbalisms to obscure that he has not.

Unfortunately, we didn’t discover ethics first – perhaps had Mises solved the problem in ethics, other fields would have grasped the significance. Although, other fields have addressed ethics with softer variants of operationalism and construction – particularly science. They have never reformed ’truth’ as performative: as testimony, or ‘true witness’, as evidenced by that which is operational and constructible. At least in the discipline of law, strict construction, original intent, and deliberate modification of law is an understood if not obeyed principle. Operationalism may allow us to make truthful testimony, and truthful testimony is the only truth that humans are capable of creating. All else is imaginary, as is infinity.

But whether we retain the approximation of classical reasoning as a practical matter of utility, or adopt construction and operation as a requirement for attestable truth in other disciplines really doesn’t matter as much as it does in ethics, politics and law. Physics, science, psychology, math and logic are luxury goods and rarely involve involuntary transfer and provide an incentive for conflict. But, cooperation is a necessary good. Politics and law are necessary goods. Strict construction is necessary and beneficial since it permits the rational resolution of conflicts, and as such prevents them. Strict construction makes it impossible to use empty verbalisms to advocate involuntary transfers as ‘moral’. Operational definitions make it much harder to lie, cheat and steal.

Under operationalism, performative truth, constructivism, the field of ethics, including the domains of criminal, unethical, immoral and conspiratorial, and conquest prohibitions, can be described as an objective uniform logic as Mises suggested it might be. We can construct a formal logic of cooperation – ethics. And, we can do it using ratio-scientific language, via operational and constructive means. We can do it in the common universal and transparent language of science using hypothesis, theory and law, and model our laws using axioms constrained by correspondence to this empirical laws. We do not need false authoritarianism, pseudoscientific obscurant terminology, or a cult or obscure continental language to do it. An irony perhaps that Mises did not grasp that he was justifying the logic of human action, which is by definition operational and constructive in an argumentative structure that was not operational nor constructive. In hindsight this approach is either humorous or tragic.

While we are not sure yet, it is possible that Popper was correct, and that we can never know if we possess the most parsimonious description of any phenomenon – what we call ‘truth’ or ‘ultimate truth’ – we can, instead of spending our lives in a quest for the non-existant and logically unknowable, instead, publish recipes that we can testify truthfully to the construction of, and performance of, as correspondent with reality. This is the difference between european commitment to always speaking the truth, and producing many, many technological successes, versus academic publishing a welfare queens, never responsible for our words, and never accountable for the consequences. This is the difference between anglo empirical truth, and cosmopolitan pragmatic truth.

The 20th century’s failed quest for a definition of truth, is the narrative structure that I’ve been searching for. Until recently, I just couldn’t find a way of talking about Mises’ work in the broader context of intellectual development. He clearly intuited the problem, as did those in other fields, but besides having the Jewish obsession with words-as-reality, and the German obsession with authority, he did not understand math and science well enough, and certainly had no exposure to computer science and the problem of computability. Why he proceeded onward and constructed an elaborate nonsensical pseudoscience in the Cosmopolitan tradition is something that only he could answer. And why subsequent generations have created a cult out of this pseudoscience, complete with typical cosmopolitan saturation of the informational commons with propaganda supporting of the pseudosicence, including heroic figure worship, and heaping unworthy praise at every opportunity, is up to those still living to explain.

It is worth noting that Popper too largely relied on narrative verbalisms, such as his ‘three worlds’ hypothesis, and we know that he resorted to Krugman-like distortion of facts in his criticisms of the left. And we know that Popper’s real purpose was not about science it self, but his agenda to undermine scientific certainty, much as did Mises, by rendering truth in to platonic form, removing responsibility from the scientist for true testimony, and casting cosmopolitan Critique, originated in hermeneutic interpretation of scripture, as the means of scientific social organization, rather than the previous anglo saxon and german requirement for truthful testimony.

ALl these thinkers failed to stem the tide of marx’s socialism, rothbardian libertinism, and Straussian neoconservatism, because all tried to counter pseudoscience with pseudoscience, and empty verbalism with empty verbalism. However the manner of correcting those people was always available to us, and had been for centuries if not millennia: a requirement that we tell the truth, and persecution under law for not doing so.

As Hoppe states, Hayek failed as well, both to make this connection with performative truth as a means of social order, and to move from the classical liberal and therefore psychological school of thought to the calculative rigor of logic by identifying property as the first and necessary object or unit of commensurability. He did understand the law and the common law, clearly, as the institutional means for resolving conflicts – better than anyone else as far as I know. But he did not grasp the difference between legal REASON (approximation necessary for discovery) and logical CALCULATION (precision necessary for truth). Nor between knowledge of use (correspondence as truth) and knowledge of construction (truth in existence). (Although I’m willing to admit that I might be one of the few people who currently does.)

Later in life Mises appears to waffle a bit, if not reverse himself. But because of what appears to be his fascination with Kantian a priorism, he didn’t see the parallel between his (inarticulate) argument that economics was both empirical and logical, and reverse mathematics, in which one constructs necessary axioms one can testify to as extant, after using empirical and logical means by which to approximate the solution to a problem.

My original goal was to provide conservatives a vehicle for argument using what I saw as libertarian rationalism. Conversely, I wanted to make it impossible to conduct deceptive arguments in the religious, progressive and postmodern forms, but in doing so I found an answer to a century or more old conflict in the history of thought.

And I think I can rescue Mises and Hoppe from the ‘fruitcake fringe’ of rationalist argument. Which is helpful. Since I want, like most, a plan to obtain liberty in my lifetime. And while any value Mises had has been already incorporated into economic thought, only fringe groups have incorporated Hoppe’s criticism of democracy and use of competing private insurance organizations to replace monopoly bureaucracy in the production of regulation.

Unfortunately, Hoppe appears too entrenched and committed to praxeology as pseudoscience, the fallacy of aggression which is merely a means of licensing fraud by verbal means and creating a parasitic class immune from both physical and legal punishment. And has merely adopted the marxist ‘commune’ as his model of rebellion. Which just because we desire liberty, is just as economically impossible as it is if we desire communism. Wishful thinking is not action. Its wishing others will do the work for you.

Liberty was created only by europeans, because of rare ancient circumstances, whereby warriors granted one another insurance against theft of their property obtained from their cattle raids, and required equality of one another because of their battle tactics requiring independent financing, action and maneuver, at high risk. These people built an ethic that would give birth to science, reason, property and liberty, because it forces man to use his mind in terms which accurately correspond to reality: Tell the truth, and only the truth. Fulfill your commitments at risk of life. Construct a brotherhood of property owners two whom familial trust is extended. And force all free riding out of society so that all persons must participate in production, and none can resort to parasitism. Liberty is obtained at the point of metal object, by denying others access to power. Everything else is merely wishful thinking, or an attempt to free ride on the efforts of those who do construct liberty. The natural aristocracy is not created by a small population. It is created by every living soul willing to bear arms to prevent the accumulation of sufficient power to deny others sovereignty over their property: For one and all, to deny one and all, access to the property of one and all by other than voluntary, fully informed, warrantied, exchange free of externality.

Cheers
Curt Doolittle
The Philosophy of Aristocracy
The Propertarian Institute
Kiev, Ukraine

LINKS
Constructive Mathematics:
Mathematical Intuitionism:
Operationalism:
Praxeology

 

(intellectual arms dealing) (retaking the brand of liberty from the lunatic fringe)

Rothbardians are relying upon and spreading numerous fallacies: (a) the fallacy of the NAP/IVP as the moral and legal basis for an anarchic polity, (b) the fallacy of aggression rather than the necessity of trust, (c) and the fallacies of the origin of property rights as either intrinsic or augmentative, (d) and the fallacy that economics is aprioristic rather than empirical and operational.

And because of these fallacies, all Rothbardians – and in practice, all anarcho-libertarians who subscribe to these fallacies – expend politically wasted effort themselves, distract from more productive efforts of others, perpetuate ideas that have been demonstrated to fail in the market for political preference, materially harmed the brand of liberty, and hindered our possibility of obtaining liberty by confusion, misdirection and delay. Rothbardian ethics are objectively immoral under rational analysis, and the market has deemed them immoral by experience, consideration and intuition. All forward motion on liberty has been toward classical liberalism and classical liberal ethics, and decidedly against rothbardian ethics – contrary to the claims of rothbardians.

Since libertarian leaders have worked for and achieved a cult language and cult status that is insulated from criticism and innovation by faith in these principles; then the only alternative is to make rothbardian and misesian arguments intellectually embarrassing, and argumentatively impossible to use in public discourse, by arming opponents with the means to defeat them.

At the very least this will limit the damage that they can do. But it will also cleanse the liberty movement, and the brand name ‘libertarian’ of its acquired continental and cosmopolitan absurdity, and allow classical liberals, aristocratic egalitarians, and private government advocates, all of whom advocate for high trust societies, to return the discourse on liberty to rational, empirical, and historical grounds.

CONTRARY TO ROTHBARDIAN AND MISESIAN COSMOPOLITAN FALLACIES:

FREE RIDING
-free riding vs natural rights-
1) Upon agreeing to cooperate, one takes upon the moral hazard of free riding. Free riding is an logical antagonist to cooperation. If free riding is present, then it is not logical to cooperate. Property emerged prior to economic production as a prohibition on free riding prior to the division of labor and most likely as monogamy. The property rights constitute a precise, positive legal articulation of the general negative necessity of preventing free riding such that cooperation is a rational choice.

MINIMUM RIGHTS
– minimum necessary set of property rights-
2) The minimum necessary prohibitions on free riding include both the criminal and the ethical, with the option for negotiation on the moral. Otherwise transaction costs are too high for the rational choice of an anarchic polity over an authoritarian one. No ingroup polity of any kind exists without inclusively criminal, ethical, and moral prohibitions. It is possible to construct a federation of polities, as the medieval monarchies demonstrated, wherein cooperation between factions is limited to low trust – enforcement of merely criminal prohibitions – but it is not possible to form a voluntary polity without prohibition of at least criminal and ethical, if not some modicum of moral prohibitions. People demonstrate that they will demand an authority to suppress immoral action, or to mandate universal moral behavior, if the common law does not provide a means of preventing immoral behavior. (Where immoral behavior constitutes an involuntary transfer of costs by moral hazard, most commonly in the form of free riding.) In other words, the jewish quarter and the transient gypsies can only survive if they constitute small minorities at the will of an omnipotent host ruler – which we saw under both byzantine, muslim and aristocratic european societies. That is not liberty. That is merely a form of tolerance used to reduce costs.

INSUFFICIENCY OF NAP
– the NAP/ISV is insufficient in scope for the formation of a voluntary polity –
3) The NAP under ISV only prohibits criminal, but not unethical or immoral or conspiratorial, or conquest behaviors. For this reason it is insufficient basis for the discipline of cooperation: ethics and morality, and as basis for the institution of law: the definition of property rights.

Instead, property rights must address all ethical and moral conflicts that are necessary to eliminate market demand for authoritarian intervention. And since all objective moral arguments and corresponding property definitions, consist of involuntary transfers that violate the prohibition on free riding, we can construct no libertarian argument against it.

Unless the scope of prohibitions on free riding is sufficient, transaction costs render demand for the state preferable to demand for liberty.

IGNORING TRUST
-the degree of trust determines economic velocity: wealth-
4) Secure, and extensive Property rights, that suppress free riding, such that all are required to contribute to production, rather than survive off of parasitism, create trust: the ability to take risks, and to increase the velocity of production and trade, by reducing transaction costs.

The level of trust corresponds directly to the degree of suppression of free riding created by the scope of prohibition of property rights, enforceable under law.

The economic velocity of an economy corresponds directly to the degree of trust formed in a polity by the legal enforcement of property rights.

FAILED CONSTRUCTIVISM
-Mises’ legacy is that he failed to produce a constructivist argument-
4) During the late nineteenth century a movement to prevent a newly emergent form of logical mysticism (platonism) emerged under various names: intuitionistic and constructivist mathematics, operationalism in science, various linguistic movements in logic, and misesian praxeology in economics.

All of these movements correctly intuited some problem with the emerging platonic concept of truth, but failed to accomplish it. This is because, constructive proof, correspondent proof (testing) and correspondent hardening (falsification) were not understood as ethical prohibitions on truth claims – and that truth was performative. That the act of testimony required demonstration of construction (internal consistency) demonstrating knowledge of construction, in addition to correspondence (external correspondence which demonstrates knowledge of use), and attempted falsification (demonstrating knowledge of durability).

Mises intuited correctly, like intellectuals in other fields, that something was erroneous with the work of positivist (correlative, but not causal) economists. But he failed to grasp that praxeology was a problem of empirical observation, reduction to operations, testing those operations by sympathetic experience, before one could make a truth claim about any economic phenomenon.

Mises simply failed. He failed worse than the advocates of operationalism and intuitionism. Who only failed to overcome objections. But his failure was compounded by the fact that had he correctly identified the problem of performative truth – that the constraint upon economic statements was one of testimony (truth telling), rather than deduction from first principles, it is possible that the leaders of other fields would have understood their predicament, and correctly distinguished between performative truth, constructive truth, correspondent truth, and ultimate truth.

ETHICAL AND EMPIRICAL NOT LOGICAL
-praxeology is both an empirical, and an ethical constraint-
5) As such, praxeology, whether we constaint it to action (rational action), cooperation (ethics), or economics (the voluntary organization of production) is a scientific process like all other epistemic processes, where we make observations, construct a theory, test it for proof of correspondence, falsify it for proof of durability, test our knowledge of construction for proof construction, and testify that we have proofs of correspondence, falsification, construction, and therefore possess the ethical right to make a truth claim. Once we have made such a claim we have a theory. If we, as all specialists, cannot find a means of falsifying it, then we have a law.

All empirical concepts must follow this process. All technological innovation must follow this process. All acts of production must follow this process. All pursuit of knowledge must follow this process.

(Note: I am not sure if falsification is a test of parsimony or not. I think that may be the correct terminology – or something close.)

CONFLATION OF THEORETICAL AND SCIENTIFIC
-Conflation of Theoretically Descriptive Science with Axiomatically Prescriptive Logic-
6) The conflation of theoretical systems which are limited to their correspondence to reality, and axiomatic systems which are limited only to their statements. Theoretical systems consist of descriptive statements constrained by reality, and axiomatic systems consist of *prescriptive* statements, not constrained by reality. Mises claim that economics is both aprioristic, axiomatic and scientific is by definition a pseudoscientific statement, since the definition of a science is that which adheres to the scientific method. Models may be constructed by axiomatic declarations, but any correspondence with reality requires that we accept that those axiomatic declarations, constitute analogies to theoretical descriptions whose basis is always empirical.

FALLACY OF A PRIORISM VS EMPIRICISM
-Analysis of human behavior is an empirical pursuit-
7) Praxeology (the study of action) , The Logic of Cooperation (the study of ethics), and Economics (the study of the voluntary organization of production) meet the criteria for empirical sciences, under which, through observation, we can reduce to hypothesis, theory and law.

And with these laws we can construct axioms, for use in models, which function as logical instruments that allow us to contemplate what our limited cognitive abilities cannot contemplate without the use of various logical instruments: language, narrative, Operationalism, logic, numbers, mathematics.

We can then test the truth of these axioms operationally and attempt to deduce whether it is possible for rational actors to perform according to the hypothesis, theory and law. If we cannot operationally describe those actions, and validate them through sympathetic experience as being rational, then they are not true. (This is the technique used in intuitionist mathematics.)

-constancy of relations vs arbitrary precision-
While cooperative relations are inconstant, and arguably each action is unique, patterns of relations are not inconstant and unique, and because of chaotic distribution of information, information, incentives and actions (changes in state) organically distribute (evolve) at different rates. Therefore we can predict trends of patterns, but not individual actions, any more than we can predict the position of any given physical entity at the subatomic level.

That we cannot predict anything other than as a probability over a given period of time, does not render something unobservable, or unscientific. We need only be able to demonstrate that in fact, regularity exists at some given level of precision over some period of time. That is what determines whether a deductive statement is expressible as an hypothesis, theory or law: whether we can determine some regularity at some **scale** – some level of precision. Infinite precision is not possible, but the standard of precision is determined by the maximum utility we can obtain at the minimum level of regularity we can observe and describe.

This constitutes “the problem of arbitrary precision”: General rules (theories) require us to adopt the available level of precision. Pure mathematics uses completely arbitrary precision, which is why it scales infinitely. But once we apply any general mathematical rule, to any particular description of reality, we include the necessary level of precision in the context. Machining valve, sawing a 2×4, navigating a ship, navigating an interplanetary satellite, and measuring the distance to the farthest observable object require different levels of precision, and we can only achieve certain levels of precision. That does not mean we cannot perform those operations using the same mathematics. It merely means we must apply contextual precision.

-the scope of newton’s laws-
Newton’s laws for example, and geometry for that matter, remain constant at human scale. But at very large and very small scale, due to the problems of velocity and immeasurability these rules fail. There are no universal statements expressible as operations that are not reductio fallacies. All hypotheses, theories and laws are subject to increases in precision or loss of utility by replacement with other hypotheses theories and laws.

-the unpredictability of gasses-
We cannot predict the course of any particular molecule when releasing a gas, but that does not mean that we cannot predict the overall distribution of molecules upon their release, and the rate of its dispersion.

-the neutrality of money-
We argue that money is neutral, but only over long and unpredictable periods of time. Is that an empirical question, or a logical one? We can deduce it, and it appears logical, but is our evidence sufficient to consider it a Law, Theory or Hypothesis. At present it is merely an hypothesis. But it is certainly not a law.

-the minimum wage-
We argue that minimum wage increases unemployment. Is that a logical or empirical question but it does not increase unemployment for all of those employed, and it occurs over unpredictable periods of time.

-emergent phenomenon: the stickiness of prices-
We did not deduce that prices would be as sticky as they are. We discovered it empirically – by observation. Is the stickiness of prices sufficient to meet the standard of hypothesis, theory or law? At present it is a theory that is widely accepted.

-the non-deducibility of emergent phenomenon-
We cannot deduce nor have we deduced emergent economic phenomenon. We can validate economic propositions deductively by reducing them to a series of actions, each of which is subject to sympathetic experience, and as such open to a subjective test of rationality. But that too is an empirical test. We observe and sense our reactions.

ARGUMENTATION (I don’t state this well enough yet)
-The fallacy of argumentation ethics-
8) Argumentation Ethics are fallacious because the choice of the strong is always between the use of violence to obtain what one desires, or the value of voluntary exchange, or boycott of worthless interactions.

Human choice is always ternary: violence, cooperation or boycott, and never, under any condition, reduced to the binary choice of cooperation or boycott – argumentative contradiction is a fallacy since and agreement to temporarily cooperate on a given scope is merely utilitarian, and conveys nothing beyond the matter in question.

Whereas, a contract for cooperation consists of a gamble that long term cooperation will be more beneficial, even if it results in various profits and losses. Numerous authors have stated similar arguments in non operational means. But Operationalism tells us that argumentation is empty – because we never surrender our violence, and as such never enter into a contradiction, merely demonstrate a preference.

Curt Doolittle
The Philosophy of Aristocracy
The Propertarian Institute
Kiev Ukraine.

 

- Guest Post by Eli Harman – November 22nd, at 7:04am

The allegation is often made (by libertarian anarchists) that what states do is fundamentally incalculable, but that it is always negative sum. In other words, we cannot know the absolute value of any state or state policy, but we can be certain about its sign.

Voluntary trades in the marketplace – as the argument goes – are always mutually beneficial (else they wouldn’t occur) and positive sum.

State policies differ in requiring coercion. If they did not require coercion, they could occur in the marketplace. But if they do, then someone is losing out, so there is no way to be sure they represent a net gain. Without the mechanism of voluntary exchange, the information transmitted by prices in a marketplace are absent and no calculation is possible. In all likelihood they represent a net loss, certainly a loss relative to the opportunity cost of the purely voluntary marketplace foregone.

But is doesn’t seem that states ever would have become ubiquitous or persistent if this were true. Empirically, state-ridden peoples have proven competitive against stateless ones. If error and parasitism were the whole story, they would not be. States, after all, are in constant conflict and competition with one another and with alternatives (or at least they were at one time.)
However, the argument is incomplete and therefore incorrect.

We can reasonably expect voluntary, fully-informed, exchanges – free of externality – to be Pareto improvements. (They make someone better off and no one worse off.)

But in the first place, market transactions don’t always live up to this standard, because they are not necessarily fully informed nor free of externality.

And in the second place, some of the things states do might; because they are of the nature of voluntary exchanges.
An individual exchanges the sum total of costs a state imposes (on them) for the sum total of benefits it offers (to them) every time they voluntarily choose not to move to the jurisdiction of another state. (And these exchanges can be made more precisely calculable by reducing the exit costs and increasing the number and variety of states on offer.)

Furthermore, all states require the voluntary consent of at least enough individuals and groups to successfully compel the submission of the remainder. And the coalition that arises to perform this function arises by a process of reciprocal exchange (You want such and such a boon to participate in our coalition? Well we want this concession and that from you in exchange.)
In brokering these exchanges, a Monarchy offers several advantages over a democratically elected government.

A democracy will be inherently and irreparably susceptible to negative-sum corruption because of the problem of concentrated benefits and dispersed costs. A policy which benefits 1,000 people $10,000 each may be politically profitable even if it costs a million people $100 each. The concentrated interest will be relatively less hampered by information costs and coordination problems. So it will be able to muster more votes and resources in defense of the policy than those harmed will be able to muster against it, though the harm be much greater.

Nothing would stop anyone from proposing such a policy to a king. And a king could get away with implementing it. But a king, who owns his realm and title, as well as its capital value, would not benefit from doing so. The future revenue he could expect to derive from his realm and subjects would decline as a result. And so his incentive would be to veto such proposals.

Furthermore, in a majority democracy, if your ruling coalition encompasses more than 51 percent of voters, it’s leaving rents on the table. If you’re getting, say, 70 percent of the vote, that simply means you’re delivering more value than you need to and failing to extract as much as you could. You could take a little more and give a little less without losing the election. So in a democracy, we can expect the ruling coalition at any given time to consist of about 51% of voters (and those the worst 51%) and that does indeed seem to be what we see.

But conflict and compulsion, though inevitable and irresolvable under democracy, are costly and actually largely unnecessary. So we can expect a wise monarch to start building his coalition of supporters with the best and keep working his way down the list until the only people that remain in need of compulsion are those who have nothing to offer which is worth what they demand in exchange for voluntary cooperation: in short, people who probably should be coerced.

 

-Guest Post By James Santanaga

“How dare you attempt to _HIDE_ your ‘Hate’ behind Science!”
- The Liar’s Mantra I

“How dare you attempt to _EXPLAIN_ your ‘Hate’ with Science!”
- The Liar’s Mantra II

“How dare you attempt to _JUSTIFY_ your ‘Hate’ with Science!”
- The Liar’s Mantra III

“How dare you attempt to _CONDONE_ your ‘Hate’ with Science!”
- The Liar’s Mantra IV

“Truth is never, ever an excuse such _FEELINGS_ or _CONCLUSIONS_ on this issue!”
- The Liar’s Mantra V

“This issue is just too important & critical to allow the involvement of Truth and Science!”
- The Liar’s Mantra VI

The Liars will always proclaim that they love & embrace Truth & Science.

In reality they don’t.

Liars only love and embrace truth and science when it is convenient and seems to support or can be twisted to support their claims and religious dogma (e.g., secular humanism, tribalism or ethno-chauvinistic supremacist views, etc.).

Outside of that narrow exception delineated above which utilizes the simple binary litmus test of: (a) Is it good for my views? and/or (b) Is it good for my people/group?, Truth and Science becomes not just bothersome but extremely dangerous due to its destructive capabilities.

At this very moment then, Truth and Science threatens to slaughter the Liar’s own Sacred Cows, therefore, Truth and Science must and will be completely disregarded while the Truth Speaker or Scientist will be tortured and slowly murdered in front of the fellow villagers in the public square.

Call all Liars to the carpet. Hold their faces to the fire. Don’t let go until they have been fully asphyxiated or immolated in the flame.

And then repeat for several more minutes for safety before removing head(s) and placing on a pike(s) in the public square with an interpretative sign explaining (a) why this occurred, (b) how they caused it and (c) they deserved it.

 

—“The primary concern of mathematics is numbers, and this means the positive integers. . . . In the words of Kronecker, the positive integers were created by God. Kronecker would have expressed it even better if he had said that the positive integers were created by God for the benefit of man (and other finite beings). Mathematics belongs to man, not to God. We are not interested in properties of the positive integers that have no descriptive meaning for finite man. When a man proves a positive integer to exist, he should show how to find it. If God has mathematics of his own that needs to be done, let him do it himself.”— (Bishop 1967, Chapter 1, A Constructivist Manifesto, page 2)

—“If God has mathematics of his own that needs to be done, let him do it himself. “—

Yes, and equally so:

**If
 god has morality of his own that he needs to be done, then let him do that himself as well.**  

Man’s only possible morality consists in fully informed, warrantied, voluntary exchange, free of negative externality.


 

The way the Jewish people held sway over their members, is the same way that all religious cults hold sway: there are mandatory beliefs, mandatory language, and mandatory rituals that one must follow or be ostracized. And as long as the benefits of the group are sufficient that threat of ostracization provides incentive to hold to those norms, then people do so out of purely utilitarian choice.

Rallying and Shaming of the Feminists and Socialists works by the same means: neo-puritan and postmodern language demands verbal, belief, and ritualistic conformity or they will rally, shame, and attempt to ostracize you.
Ludwig von Mises attempts to create an equally mandatory pseudoscience of praxeology in order to demand compliance of members. Rothbard expanded Mises’ approach and this approach was a failure until Rockwell and Tucker use the new medium of the web to compete with the old media. And for a short while, it worked.

However, science and truth telling have won the day and the world now speaks in science – leaving mises verbal cult adrift and associated with the lunatic fringe.

And even worse, the world has been systematically abandoning philosophy as a cult language for more than half a century. And its important that the world does so, because philosophy was the ruse under which these systems of lies were constructed and propagated.

That is simply because science corresponds more accurately with reality than does any other form of language – because scientists have the least perverse incentives than anyone other than mathematicians. And even mathematicians still engage in fanciful platonism – moreso than do scientists.

So what use is philosophy? Prior to propertarianism, cognitive science and experimental psychology, I think it was necessary for debating moral discourse. But at present, as far as I can see, it is merely a primitive system of measurement limited to human scale. Perhaps, better stated, it is the means by which we attempt to construct theories such that we may test them, refine them, and state them operationally.

In that sense, philosophy, is merely a looser member of the logics, and a subset of science, which in turn is a subset of truth telling.

 

Popper would have been better off saying that he was advising us on the search for precision and parsimony, by making truthful statements along the way, rather than coopting the word ‘truth’ from his spiritual background. We are not investigating the mind of god. Nothing is obscured from us. Nature doesn’t try to lie to us, nor is nature mistaken.

The question is not ‘is that true’ but ‘can I testify to and warranty this?”

Linguistic blame avoidance caused a lot of ripple effects in philosophy.

But popper’s culture was not one of truth telling (as his own rhetorical attacks on competitors evidences.) Cosmopolitans are pragmatists not truth tellers. They do not warranty their speech as do westerners.

Meaning in cosmopolitanism is utilitarian and escapable, not truthful and warrantied.

Popper relies upon cosmopolitan truth (the unknowable mind of god), and cosmopolitan truthfulness (non-warrantied speech).

This is why he could advance science but that was the limit of his solution.

 

Progress in 2014
(new video!)

 

—“Very possibly classical mathematics will cease to exist as an independent discipline”— (Bishop, 1970, p. 54)

I can translate this into something scary:

“Very possibly, classical philosophy and science will cease to exist as independent disciplines.”

That is precisely what I am up to – although I didn’t know it when I started. :)

 

WE JUSTIFY:
(a) To convey meaning – to provide a path by which we incrementally transfer properties by analogy to achieve conclusions.
(b) To convey honesty – to demonstrate that we are telling the truth to the best of our understanding.
(c) To demonstrate the we adhere to NORMS in our reasoning – that we have not violated the social contract. (This is how we get into all sorts of interesting problems. Because truth is only truth in the sense that we mean it, in the west.)

AND CONVERSELY:

(d) To lie – to lead others to false conclusions by design.
(e) To vector a lie for pragmatic purposes – to lead others to conclusions we prefer using the arguments of others as a matter of practical action.

AND HOW DO WE ACHIEVE THE FORMER WITHOUT THE LATTER?

(f) separate the route by which we establish meaning, from the route by which we demonstrate truth. It is possible to construct a theory by any means, but it is only possible to testify to the truth of it by operational means – existentially possible means, and in matters of human action, SUBJECTIVELY TESTABLE means. (rationality of incentives).

MATH CONFUSED US.

In mathematics, at least, for the most part, the means of conducting operations to solve a problem is nearly identical to the means of demonstrating the construction of a solution using existentially possible operations.

We sought to copy mathematics – starting with the Greeks.  But we lacked the understanding of why math was so effective at the ascertaining truth of relations: because there is very little difference between the process of theorizing and the process of construction.

Curt Doolittle
The Propertarian Institute

 

We can construct libertarianism as a (a) sentimental, (b) ratio-moral, or (c) ratio-legal, or (d) legal-empirical framework – a body of interdependent arguments.

But if we rely upon sentimental, and ratio-moral construction, then statements are not decidable, and opinion still influences the decision – we leave open not only the possibility of, but the preference for the addition of subjective preference into any decision. That is why we cannot construct rule of law upon ratio-moral arguments – revisionism and evolutionary corruption. 

This is why libertarianism in the anglo tradition has been constructed as a legal framework rather than moral framework of the cosmopolitan and continental traditions – by using strict construction and original intent. 

However, while this construction – as a system of calculation, which prohibits, unlike rationalism, the introduction of information not present in the original construction – still leaves open the question as to what determines the scope and limits to property upon which a ratio-legal law is calculated. 

Empirical-legal evidence tells us that if we wish to construct a libertarian society, that we must define property as that which people treat as property by defense of it, and retaliation for violations of it. 

Without this knowledge we cannot eliminate demand for the state as an imposer of arbitrary norms, and suppressor of retaliation for violations of property that humans demonstrate they intuit as their property. 

There is only one way to eliminate the state, and that is to eliminate demand for it, by providing a sufficient body of property rights law, that all disputes are rationally decidable without the addition of subjective information.

 

Hurry! Today, you can cleanse yourself of Anglo enlightenment universalism, German Rationalism, Jewish Pseudoscience, Christian Superstition, and whatever other other intellectual disease the ails you. (Members of the Cathedral, Islamism and Buddhism may require higher doses and longer treatment periods.) Save humanity from all variants of the Levantine Plague.

Sorry. No discounts. It’s against our principles.

-The Management

 
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